This paper examines the economic and social underpinnings of rising political instability in South Africa such as poverty, unemployment and inequality.
In sum, our analysis suggests that South Africa may be approaching a political turning point, depending on the outcome of the public struggle for power between two main factions within the ANC. This is, in the words of the 2016
State of the Nation edited volume, because government is being 'tested by mounting demands, but falls short in its response…' 2 When government is absent, distracted or incompetent, other agencies and actors move in to fill the associated void, and new political dynamics emerge.
In the sections that follow we first examine the economic and social underpinnings of political instability in South Africa, particularly the economic and social fundamentals such as poverty, unemployment and inequality. The second section reviews patterns of violence across different categories before concluding with a brief analysis of the extent to which corruption, poor governance and lacklustre leadership drive rising levels of violence. This paper thus sets the stage for a separate paper on scenarios to 2024 and an accompanying policy brief of recommendations.
Poverty and unemployment in South Africa
A study carried out by the Development Policy Research Unit at the University of Cape Town indicates that South Africa has experienced strong declines in multidimensional poverty since 1993 as well as significant improvements in ownership or access to private assets such as a stove, a fridge, a television, a vehicle and so on. 3 Many of these gains have been thanks to the ANC's commitment to roll out various services, and, until recently, steady economic growth.
Since 1994, the response of the South African government to underdevelopment, poverty and inequality of the majority black By 2015, 16.9 million South Africans were receiving social grants population occurred in two broad and overlapping phases. In the early 1990s, it provided housing, potable water, electricity and immunisation coverage to most households with a degree of free services. Achievements in these areas were rapid and demonstrable. Since 1994, an estimated 3.4 million homes have been built, and potable water access rose from 58% in 1994 to 91% in 2009. 4 The late 1990s saw the beginning of a second phase of development characterised by the provision of various cash grants, such as the Child Support Grant. By 2015, 16.9 million South Africans were receiving social grants, compared to 4 million in 1994. Social security transfers rose to 3.5% of GDP, which relatively high by international comparative standards.
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While costly, such grants have alleviated deep-seated poverty.
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They have also had limited impacts on reducing inequality, but none on unemployment, arguably the biggest challenge facing post-apartheid South Africa. 
Inequality and labour
The inequality ratio of the top 10% of South Africans to the bottom 10% is 55:1. For comparison purposes, the inequality ratio of Brazil, another high-middle income country with a comparable degree of social instability, is 42:1. 13 Blacks make up the vast majority of the unemployed and social grant recipients in South Africa, although the share of the black workforce with higher education almost doubled between 1995 and 2011, and the number of blacks graduating from higher education institutions every year now exceeds that of whites. 14 Still, the poorest four income deciles (i.e. the bottom 40% of income earners) are unemployed, and the majority are based in rural areas, areas previously designated as homelands or informal settlements around towns and cities, and are predominantly black.
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Youth unemployment in South Africa is particularly high. The International Labour
Organization estimates that youth unemployment (those aged between 15 and 24)
in South Africa is 52% -more than four times the rate for the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. 16 Recent publications by Stats SA confirm these alarming findings.
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Inequality in the middle 40% of the income distribution reveals 'a startling cliff between higher and lower earners' 18 that is significantly worse than that of comparable countries such as Turkey, Brazil, Mexico and Thailand. In the words of Levy et al. (2015) 'the rate at which opportunities for entering the economic elite have opened up has lagged the pace of political change.' 19 While the public media emphasise attention on defining income in racial terms, where the majority of the white population continues to maintain substantial economic privilege, much less attention is focused on the large wage disparities within the lower income groups. Additionally, because there is a correlation between lower average per capita incomes and larger households, the low income of earners at the bottom of the income curve are shared with more people.
Relative to other middle-income countries, South African households are thus either (relatively) affluent or poor, with a limited stepladder for moving incrementally from one economic stratum to another. Among many other subsequent afflictions, these developments have set the stage for increased levels of local-level patronage and for so-called tenderpreneurs (individuals skilled at obtaining government contracts through political contacts) that work their way around the procurement processes and the law to access economic opportunity. 20 These tendencies have become rife within the ANC at every level but are most pronounced in local government.
While the public media emphasise defining income in racial terms, there is less attention on the large wage disparities within the lower income groups
The patterns of distance and exclusion are also evident in the distinction between unskilled and formal labour. The South African labour market is increasingly segmented between insider and outsider groups, probably best reflected in the change in composition of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), now dominated by skilled, white-collar rather than poorer workers. and conflict-ridden industrial relations, which enable some unionised workers to lift themselves up from the lower parts of the distributional cliff -but raise the cost (in terms of both earnings and conflict) of employing workers, and thereby contribute to undercutting economic dynamism in the mid-range of the labour market.'
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In sum, relative to other middle-income countries, 'South Africa has an unusually small fraction of the population that gains directly from sustained economic growth.' 23 The result is huge pressure from those at the bottom of the distributional cliff to improve their economic circumstances through informal income, political connections and collective action within the fold of the governing tripartite alliance.
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Despite government claims to the contrary, the benefits of growth are not trickling down sufficiently, even when South Africa was growing rapidly. The absolute number of unemployed is growing -although it is important to recognise that employment is also growing in absolute numbers. 25 In addition, South Africa is experiencing a demographic dividend, i.e. the size of its working age population (aged 15 to 64 years of age) is expanding as a proportion of its total population. Thus, in 2015, the labour force grew by 20 000 more South Africans from the previous year.
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South Africa has an unusually small fraction of the population that gains directly from sustained economic growth
At an estimated GDP growth rate of 0.8% for 2016, the Quarterly Labour Force
Survey from Stats SA (to December 2015) presents a clear picture of a labour market under pressure. Instead of creating employment in the formal sector, job creation has shifted to the informal sector. Of a notable 505 000 jobs created in 2015, almost half (236 000) were in the informal sector, where the compensation wage levels are typically survivalist. Next came 269 000 jobs created in the formal sector, 118 000 agricultural jobs and 75 000 in private households. Most jobs were lost in the manufacturing, utilities and construction industries in the last quarter of 2015. 27 Low growth facilitates job creation in the less productive informal sector, as job seekers struggle to survive and make ends meet.
Adding to the labour and unemployment challenge are on-going electricity supply inefficiencies, a minimum wage debate (that could, if implemented at too high a level, constrain employment) and the threat of a full downgrade to so-called junk or sub-investment status that would increase borrowing costs and limit access to international finance. Why Nations Fail, which argues that political inclusion is a pre requisite for sustained long-term economic growth. 38 We argue that South Africa is in the midst of an incomplete transition to inclusive politics and an incomplete transition towards inclusive economics. Alongside the challenge of patrimonialism, this situation translates into declining social stability and limited prospects for future prosperity. And while efforts are currently being made to address some of the major economic challenges described in the previous section, such as the establishment of a central procurement office under Treasury, the nub is essentially political and ideological.
Economics and stability
Political in that the president, his family and business connections are often associated or implicated in these travails, and ideological in the sense that two of the three alliance partners (the South African Communist Party, SACP and COSATU) effectively frame discussions on economic choices within a narrow lexicon of statism and socialism, not to mention the impact of their weakened relations on the already struggling labour market. Whereas COSATU previously served as social sponge that could absorb social tension and pressures, its shift to represent public sector workers and associated dependency on the ANC has severely weakened the federation.
The link between politics and economics is also evident with the performance of the rand, which has been seen to strengthen with positive political developments, such as the election of Mandela in 1994, and depreciate in response to worrying political events, such as Zuma's firing of finance minister Nhlanhla Nene in December 2015 and the April 2016 ruling by the Constitutional Court that the president had not upheld his oath of office in seeking to avoid payment for additions to his private residence in Nkandla. 43 The confluence of governance and economics as a driver of social instability is discussed in the following section and forms the basis of the future projections laid out in the second paper in this series, South African scenarios 2024, as well as the subsequent separate set of policy recommendations.
Key trends in social instability in South Africa
Economic inequality, frequency of protests and trust in government are but some of the drivers of South Africa's rising social instability. While all violence is technically social as it is carried out in and by society, political aspirations and motivation are what makes violence political or public -i.e. violent protests against local government and In the sections that follow we comment on key trends in violent crime, vigilantism and xenophobic violence and end with an assessment of one of the most concerning (and growing) types of public violence in South Africa: violent demonstration. It concludes with a brief discussion of the inadequacy of state response to insecurity and, in this vein, the risk of heightened election related violence in the upcoming municipal elections and other key political events of the years to come.
Violent crime
The analysis of violent crime trends in post-apartheid South Africa is complicated by the amalgamation of the nominally independent homelands into South Africa from 1994 Zimbabwe and Lesotho. 55 This is undoubtedly influenced by the migrant labour system, which has seen mining companies recruiting workers from these countries, as well as the steady influx of job seekers from Malawi, Mozambique and Zimbabwe to South Africa over many decades. Whereas migrants from these countries are known and apparently more acceptable, the influx of Africans from further afield seems to have elicited greater reaction.
Protest and violent demonstration
Public data on political violence points to a steady incline in the total number of social instability events in South Africa since 1997, of which "riots and protests" are the most frequent in type. 56 The recent surge in service delivery protests coincides with the start of Thabo Mbeki's presidency in 1999. In the eyes of the protestors, violence is a tool through which to communicate frustration with service delivery and force a response from the government. Many instances of violent protests have followed protracted efforts at engaging with government using legitimate and non-violent methods (e.g. requests for meetings, petitions, writing letters, peaceful marches, etc.).
There is inevitably a large variation in how protest is perceived to impact on the political process. In a study on service delivery protests in two pockets of Durban, found that Cato Manor residents were far more active protestors and more prone to the use of confrontational protest tactics than survey respondents in South Durban. 60 Cato Manor residents believed that protest "got attention" and triggered the dialogue with local leaders they desired. In South Durban, protest was far less frequent, and communities reported to be even less engaged in ward meetings and other political events than their Cato Manor peers. Protesters in this area found protest was ineffective to garner the required attention from political representatives, partially because they believed their largely Indian-populated neighbourhoods were not a priority for the ruling ANC.
16% of corruption-related incidents reported to Corruption Watch in 2015 occurred at the local governance level Highlighting the overlaps between governance and instability, inadequate public sector productivity adversely affects the poor, deepens impoverishment and exacerbates social frustration, given this social class' disproportional dependence on public sector services, fuelled by a lack of means to source alternatives for state provided water, security, education, etc. In the same vein, while the state may be credited for providing monthly welfare payments to the most needy, it is this segment of society that bear the majority of the costs in the form of inefficient and poor public services. at the local governance level. 65 Moreover, even though protests and uprisings are more likely to occur in contexts that have experienced relative prosperity or growth followed by a sudden decline or reversal, the increasing volume of service delivery Data from Afrobarometer released in April 2016 suggests that employers are perceived to be more racist than courts or landlords After yet another national commissioner was eventually forced to step down through public pressure and court action, the organisation is now headed by an acting national commissioner doing his best to hold things together pending the announcement of another political appointment to parachute in to protect the president. Meanwhile, both the National Prosecuting Authority and the Hawks (the Directorate for Priority Crime
Investigation within the police) are embroiled in factional politics. 80 The leadership of these institutions is torn between its constitutional mandate and the political imperative to deliver appropriate findings that could stay prosecutions aligned to the president and his faction.
The intelligence systems are not working (since they appear to be incompetent and primarily focused on factionalism within the ruling party). The military is in such a state of disrepair due to poor funding and the release of a comprehensively inappropriate defence review that the minister recently lamented (during her 2016/17 budget vote)
that it is time for the country to decide if it wants a military.
In sum, all of the South African security institutions -across the range of police, defence force and intelligence departments -suffer from constant shifting policy direction, poor management and political compromise. The result is a state that is It is therefore no coincidence that South Africa is host to one of the world's largest private security sectors, used by households and businesses that can afford them. 81 It is often this industry rather than the police who provide order and safety in much of middle and upper class suburbia, while local vigilantes enforce community justice in squatter and informal areas, leaving an embattled police patrolling the rest.
Conclusion
The analysis set out in this paper would indicate that the types of violence people fear the most, such as robbery and murder, have increased in South Africa in recent years. Additionally, the growing frequency of demonstrations, the student protest movements, combined with the economic crisis, paint a worrying picture in the months ahead. In August 2016 the ANC will likely face a vocal challenge from both the EFF and the Democratic Alliance, and the separate paper on South African scenarios 2024 will examine, in detail, the more likely alternative options that may unfold, while a separate policy brief summarises key recommendations.
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All of the South African security institutions suffer from constant shifting policy direction, poor management and political compromise 
